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In Rucho v. Common Cause, and its companion Lamone 
v. Benisek, a sharply divided Supreme Court declined 
the opportunity to set constitutional limits on partisan 
manipulation of electoral district lines.1 Writing for a five-
justice majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts concluded that 
“partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions 
beyond the reach of the federal courts” because “[f]ederal 
judges have no license to reallocate political power between the 
two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority 
in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct 
their decisions.”2 Consequently, because the federal courts 
“have no commission to allocate political power and influence 
in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to 
guide [them] in the exercise of such authority,” he concluded 
that these cases were non-justiciable.3
Rucho is not an easy case to take seriously as doctrine. Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion is more redolent of a debater’s brief 
* Edward and Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke Law.
**  Professor of Law; Class of 1950 Herman B. Wells Endowed Professor, Indiana University 
Bloomington Maurer School of Law. 
1 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2 Id. at 2506–07.
3 Id. at 2508.
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than a judicial opinion. Rucho deploys a series of arguments 
against the justiciability of political-gerrymandering claims, 
relying on no single argument and committed to nothing but 
the conclusion of non-justiciability. Critically, the opinion 
is an amalgam of misdirections, distortions, and less-than-
pellucid thinking about the constitutionalization of political-
gerrymandering claims. This is what the Court’s inexorable 
fealty to non-justiciability gets us.
Consider, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion 
that the Constitution does not authorize federal judges to 
reallocate power between the two major political parties. As 
the chief justice well knows, or as he certainly ought to know, 
the plaintiffs were not asking the Court to “reallocate political 
power between the two major political parties.”4 That way of 
framing the problem presents it as a structural claim, which, in 
the domain of law and democracy, the Court has rejected every 
single time.5 Rather, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to do 
what it has done for over half a century, since the landmark 
reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr—to protect the individual 
right to vote by limiting the power of government officials to 
intentionally dilute the individual’s vote when it draws voting 
districts.6 Framing election law claims as purely structural, and 
thus dismissing them, is a time-honored device.7 It ignores the 
fact that law-and-democracy claims are dualistic: Individual 
and structural rights are two sides of the same law-and-politics 
4 Id. at 2507.
5  See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 micH. L. rev. 1099 (2005).
6  See Amicus Brief of Mathematicians, Law Professors, and Students in Support of 
Appellees and Affirmance at 4, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (Nos. 18–422, 18–726); see also 
Charles, supra note 5, at 1128.
7 See generally Charles, supra note 5.
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claim.8 The distortion of the question presented, to present 
the opponent’s claim in its most unfavorable light, is a clever 
debater’s trick.9 But it is a distortion; it fails to respond to the 
plaintiffs’ actual claim. 
Reasonable minds can disagree about the necessity of 
judicial supervision of partisan line-drawing. And one could 
imagine a persuasive doctrinal argument counseling against 
judicial supervision. But one would have to imagine that 
argument, as it was not offered in Rucho. This is because Rucho 
is not about doctrine. As Justice Kagan shows in her powerful 
dissent, there are easy responses to the majority’s contentions.10 
By way of example, responding to the majority’s argument that 
judicial supervision in this area can only mean that the federal 
courts would endeavor to allocate political power between the 
two major parties, she notes, matter-of-factly, that the lower 
federal courts in the very cases before the Supreme Court have 
done what the majority said could not be done.11 These lower 
courts have adjudicated these cases pursuant to recognizable 
legal standards and vindicated individual constitutional rights. 
Betraying her annoyance with the majority, Justice Kagan 
calls the majority’s lack of engagement with the lower courts’ 
substantive legal analysis “discomfiting.”12 The ease with 
which Justice Kagan was able to refute the majority’s doctrinal 
8  As a general matter, structural claims must be converted to an individual rights 
framework to make the claims justiciable, which is how the Court has historically resolved 
election law claims. Charles, supra note 5, at 1102.
9  It is notable that Justice Kagan, in her dissenting opinion, articulates the harm of partisan 
gerrymandering in both structural and individual rights terms. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 
2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering “subverts democracy” 
and “violates individuals’ constitutional rights”).
10 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509.
11  Id. at 2516 (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose: 
What it says can’t be done has been done.”).
12 Id. at 2517.
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arguments is indicative of the limited role played by legal 
doctrine in the majority’s constitutional analysis.
In the course of wrapping up her dissent, after refuting each 
aspect of the majority’s arguments against justiciability, Justice 
Kagan offers a tantalizing set of observations that invite further 
reflection. She notes that the gerrymandering claims at the 
heart of this litigation “imperil our system of government.”13 
This is where the Court must step in, she writes, because 
“[p]art of the Court’s role in [our constitutional] system is to 
defend its foundations.”14 And importantly, she argues that no 
foundation “is more important than free and fair elections.”15 
We’d like to pick up where Justice Kagan left off. The 
concluding paragraph in her dissent raises a critical question: 
Why are the conservative justices in the Rucho majority 
uninterested in defending the foundations of American 
Democracy? To phrase the question differently, why is there 
such a divide on the Court about whether it is appropriate for 
the Court to safeguard the fundamental rules of representative 
democracy? This ought to be the central question for scholars 
of law and politics. The importance of the question reaches 
beyond Rucho and the issue of political gerrymandering. It is 
the core question, for example, in Baker v. Carr,16 the case that 
frames the field of law and politics to this day. It is also the 
question in Shelby County v. Holder,17 the case that struck down 
a significant part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. If the Court 
is not defending the foundations of representative democracy, 
what is it defending? 
13 Id. at 2525.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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We argue that Chief Justice Roberts and the Rucho majority’s 
commitment to non-justiciability of partisan gerrymandering 
claims is a function of the majority’s attachment and normative 
commitment to a particular understanding of politics in a 
representative democracy. For the majority, politics is sordid, 
partisan, and unfair. For the conservatives on the Court, 
political-gerrymandering claims ask the Court to perform a 
task that courts are ill-equipped to perform, which is to clean 
up a process that is inherently dirty and to make fair a process 
that is inherently partial. Consequently, Rucho is not simply 
an affirmation of a traditional conception of politics; it is also 
a rejection of a more modern conception that is beginning to 
find a foothold in American politics—with roots in the Court’s 
malapportionment jurisprudence—about how representative 
democratic institutions ought to operate. This more modern 
approach reflects the beliefs that representative electoral 
structures and American politics more generally ought to 
include some basic notion of fairness: a commitment to the 
public good without the hindrance of partisanship and a 
conception of fair play that constrains the behavior of those 
who design electoral structures. In contrast to the majority in 
Rucho, proponents of the modern conception envision a role for 
the Court in enforcing basic rules of fairness and fair play while 
at the same time indirectly promoting a particular vision of the 
public good that is not filtered through partisan identity in the 
design of structures of representation. 
In order to understand the division in Rucho and, as 
importantly, to understand why the plaintiffs in Rucho failed to 
win over the conservatives on the Court, we have to come to 
terms with these different worldviews on the Court. Is sordid 
politics an inherently necessary and arguably normatively good 
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part of the political process, and thus a necessary part of our 
representative institutions? Relatedly, do substantive fairness 
principles exist—outside of race and the equal-population 
principle—that constrain political actors when they design 
electoral structures to favor themselves at the expense of their 
opponents? We take up these questions in the pages that follow. 
Part I discusses the majority’s reasoning in Rucho. Part 
II suggests that Rucho reflects a traditional understanding 
of politics in which dirty partisan politics is rightly a part of 
the political process. By way of conclusion, the article offers 
thoughts on the shift from normative theorizing to empiricism 
in the field of law and politics and, more importantly, why we 
remain optimistic even in the wake of Rucho.
I.  Rucho’s Reasoning: The Inevitably of Non-
Justiciability
In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts offers three arguments 
in favor of non-justiciability. The opinion does not engage 
seriously with any single argument and generally deploys 
the arguments as foils to prop up its conclusion of non-
justiciability. Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s first objection, 
the contention that the Framers intended to resolve political-
gerrymandering claims through the political process. Chief 
Justice Roberts notes that these claims are at least as old as, 
perhaps older than, the Republic. “The practice was known 
in the Colonies prior to Independence, and the Framers were 
familiar with it at the time of the drafting and ratification 
of the Constitution.”18 The Framers addressed the prospect 
of partisan gerrymandering, Chief Justice Roberts argues, 
through the Constitution’s penchant for addressing structural 
18 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494.
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problems with structural devices.19 Article I, section 4, clause 
1 of the Constitution, the Elections Clause, delegates to state 
legislatures the primary responsibility for arranging the 
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for federal 
representatives. But the Framers also provided through the 
Elections Clause that “Congress may at any time by Law make 
or alter such Regulations.” And, Chief Justice Roberts contends, 
Congress has taken its supervisory authority seriously. For 
example, relatively early on, in 1842, Congress adopted a 
statute requiring single-member districts for elections for the 
House of Representatives.20 The implication from that part of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis is that the Framers devised a 
workable and working solution to the problem. Originalism 
carries the day.
But it is unclear from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion what 
work his reliance on originalism is doing in the analysis. On 
the one hand, he concedes that the originalism analysis cannot 
support a conclusion that “the Framers set aside electoral issues 
such as the one before us as questions that only Congress can 
resolve.”21 This is because the argument that the federal courts 
cannot address claims that the government unconstitutionally 
manipulated electoral lines proves too much. “In two areas—
one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering—our cases 
have held that there is a role for the courts with respect to at 
least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of 
congressional districts.”22
19  Id. at 2494–95; id. at 2496 (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and 
considered what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning 
the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal 
Congress.”).
20  Id. at 2495.
21  Id.
22  Id. at 2495–96.
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On the other hand, notwithstanding that concession, Chief 
Justice Roberts argues that “the history is not irrelevant.”23 
The historical evidence matters because it shows that “[a]t no 
point [in the historical record] was there a suggestion that the 
federal courts had a role to play.”24 And from his search of the 
historical record, Chief Justice Roberts concludes that there was 
not “any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts” 
addressing partisan gerrymandering claims.25
Chief Justice Roberts seems to be looking for evidence 
that the Framers assigned the resolution of partisan 
gerrymandering claims to the federal courts if he is to entertain 
the prospect of judicial review of line-drawing claims. This 
analytical posture presupposes the unavailability of judicial 
review, as a general matter, unless proponents of judicial 
review prove otherwise. That is, unless proponents of judicial 
supervision find proof positive in the historical record that the 
Framers intended to delegate the resolution of these issues to 
the federal courts, they are out of luck. Chief Justice Roberts 
uses the originalism argument to create a presumption in 
favor of non-justiciability and to place the burden of proof on 
supporters of justiciability. This newly-created presumption is 
doing all of the work in the analysis. 
However, the presumption of non-justiciability—the 
assumption that the Court will find that electoral-structure 
cases are non-justiciable unless otherwise proved—appears 
to be a change of the current doctrine. With the exception of 
cases arising under the Guarantee Clause,26 the Court has not, 
up until now, placed a category of cases outside of judicial 
23 Id. at 2496.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65 U. 
coLo. L. rev. 849, 864 (1994).
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review unless proponents can prove otherwise by citing the 
words and ideas of the founding generation. At the very least, 
prior to Rucho, justiciability has seemed to be an open question, 
and one might go so far as to argue that the Court generally 
assumes justiciability unless there is affirmative evidence, in 
the constitutional text, history, or structure, that the matter was 
committed to another branch.27
But more importantly, and to reiterate a point noted above, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s originalism analysis is not squarely 
relevant to the resolution of the cases before the Court. To be 
sure, it might have been relevant if these were cases of first 
impression. But they are not. The Court has already determined 
that electoral-structure claims are justiciable. This was Baker 
v. Carr.28 (And crucially, the Court has also created judicial 
standards out of whole cloth. This was Reynolds v. Sims.29) 
To be sure, it is also conceivable that the presumption of 
non-justiciability might be determinative in future law-and-
democracy cases. That is, Rucho might stand for the proposition 
that future plaintiffs must affirmatively show that the Framers 
intended a judicial resolution of these cases. But as to Rucho, it 
is immaterial what the Framers thought about the justiciability 
of political-structure claims generally; what matters is whether 
the types of political-structure claims that the Court has 
previously found to be justiciable can be distinguished from the 
claim before the Court. 
27  In the landmark political question case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court stated, 
“the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a 
political question.” Id. at 209. The Court further stated: “Prominent on the surface of any 
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” Id. at 217. Baker seems to 
imply, if not explicitly provide, that non-justicability must be affirmatively demonstrated 
by showing that the issue was assigned to a political branch.
28 Id.
29 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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This leads to Chief Justice Roberts’s second argument. He 
appears to be boxed in by two sets of cases that the Court has 
previously determined to be justiciable—one-person, one-
vote and racial-gerrymandering claims. Chief Justice Roberts 
initially attempts to distinguish malapportionment and racial-
gerrymandering claims from political-gerrymandering claims 
on the ground that “while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart 
from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial 
discrimination in districting,” political gerrymandering is not 
illegal.30 But of course, it is no answer to distinguish political-
gerrymandering claims from malapportionment or racial-
gerrymandering claims on the ground that the Constitution 
prohibits state actors from engaging in the underlying conduct 
that gives rise to those claims. Malapportionment claims were 
once legal, just like political-gerrymandering claims, and the 
Court was not always of the view that federal courts were 
capable of remedying racial discrimination in the exercise of 
political rights.31 Chief Justice Roberts is simply begging the 
question, which is whether it should be illegal for state actors 
to undermine the individual’s right to vote by manipulating 
electoral lines for partisan gain. This is the same question, in 
slightly different form, that the Court asked generations ago: 
whether it is illegal for the government to manipulate electoral 
lines through malapportionment. The Court answered the 
second question in Baker v. Carr.32 As it did then, the least the 
Court could do today is take up the question, rather than profess 
the inability to decide it.
30 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
31  See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial 
Restraint, 132 Harv. L. rev. 236 (2018).
32 Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (holding malapportionment claims justiciable).
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Chief Justice Roberts distinguishes the justiciable electoral-
structure cases from the political-gerrymandering cases in 
two ways. First, he turns to a classic move in the case law 
and argues that partisanship in the construction of electoral 
structures is not per se unconstitutional. “To hold that 
legislators cannot take partisan interests into account when 
drawing district lines would essentially countermand the 
Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.”33 
Thus, he counsels that ‘’[t]he ‘central problem’ [in the 
partisan gerrymandering cases] is not determining whether 
a jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is 
‘determining when political gerrymandering has gone too 
far.’”34 The federal courts have no basis for determining how 
much partisanship is too much without making judgments, 
political judgments, about the allocation of political 
power. These are the types of judgments that are solely the 
responsibility of the political branches.
Second, partisan gerrymandering cases are about group 
rights and the allocation of group political power; partisan-
gerrymandering claims assume a constitutional violation on the 
basis of the inability of a group, in this case a political party, to 
translate electoral support into legislative power.35 As such, and 
to turn once again to an old canard, partisan-gerrymandering 
claims “invariably sound in a desire for proportional 
representation.”36 The essence of a partisan-gerrymandering 
claim is that dramatic departures from proportionality are 
33 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
34 Id. at 2499 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (plurality opinion)).
35  Id. (“Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of 
political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence.”).
36  Id. Roberts explicitly relies on a critique raised by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor over 
thirty years ago in the Court’s first explicit confrontation with the issue of political-
gerrymandering cases. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986).
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indicative of the state’s alleged unconstitutional manipulation 
of electoral lines in the pursuit of partisan advantage.
However, Chief Justice Roberts argues that neither 
historical practices nor the Court’s precedents requires 
proportional representation. “For more than 50 years after 
ratification of the Constitution,” he writes, “many States elected 
their congressional representatives through at-large or ‘general 
ticket’ elections.”37 Additionally, when Congress legislated the 
use of single-member districts in congressional elections, it 
did not do so in the service of proportionality, but because the 
Whig Party assumed, wrongly as it turned out, that switching 
from at-large to single-member districts would provide Whigs 
with a partisan advantage.38
Given that the Constitution does not require 
proportionality, Chief Justice Roberts concludes that courts 
have no basis for adjudicating these claims other than some 
vague notion of fairness. In his words, “federal courts are not 
equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness, 
nor is there any basis for concluding that they were authorized 
to do so.”39 To determine what is “fair,” federal courts would 
need to make numerous political decisions,40 decisions that 
trade off different conceptions of “fairness,” none of which are 
constitutionally required. For example, designers of electoral 
structures can decide to crack and pack voters in districts 
to reflect the underlying distribution of the parties’ relative 
electoral strengths, or they can make districts as competitive 
37 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40  This is because, as a point of departure, single-member districts are themselves somewhat 
unfair as compared to proportional systems. For instance, single-member districts tend 
to overrepresent the majority party and allow a plurality winner to capture one hundred 
percent of the seat. Id. at 2500.
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as possible.41 Either option can be defended on normative 
“fairness” grounds.42 “Deciding among . . . these different 
visions of fairness,” Chief Justice Roberts argues, “poses basic 
questions that are political, not legal.”43 More importantly, “[t]
here are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for 
making such judgments, let alone limited and precise standards 
that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”44 
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the 
malapportionment cases are not a useful guide. This is 
because the equal-population principle, one-person, one-
vote, “is relatively easy to administer as a matter of math. 
The same cannot be said of partisan gerrymandering claims, 
because the Constitution supplies no objective measure for 
assessing whether a districting map treats a political party 
fairly.”45 Crucially, there is no conceptual and legal equivalent 
to the equal-population principle in the context of partisan 
gerrymandering. One-person, one-vote does not lead to 
proportionality; “[i]t does not mean that each party must be 
influential in proportion to its number of supporters.”46
For somewhat analogous reasons, the racial-
gerrymandering cases are also inapposite. Echoing Justice 
Frankfurter, Chief Justice Roberts notes that the racial-
gerrymandering cases are about race and the country’s 
history of racial discrimination, not about the design of 
electoral structures. This is why the racial-gerrymandering 
cases do not raise the “justiciability conundrums” raised 
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2501.
46 Id.
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by the political-gerrymandering cases.47 “Unlike partisan 
gerrymandering claims, a racial-gerrymandering claim does 
not ask for a fair share of political power and influence.”48 
Thus, racial-discrimination claims do not ask courts to make 
political judgments, which courts are unfit to make. Instead, 
racial-gerrymandering claims ask whether the government 
has classified on the basis of race and seek the “elimination 
of a racial classification,” which is presumptively illegal.49 
This is why the “predominant purpose test” used in the 
racial-gerrymandering cases cannot be deployed in the 
partisan-gerrymandering context; the test seeks to identify an 
impermissible classification, and because partisanship is not 
impermissible, partisan-gerrymandering claims “cannot ask for 
the elimination of partisanship.”50 
To the Rucho majority, the conclusion is inescapable: Since 
the plaintiffs’ position is not supported by the constitutional 
text, by historical practices, or by the Court’s precedents, the 
Constitution does not authorize the federal courts to adjudicate 
their claims.
II. Dirty Politics as Tradition
Rucho follows a line of cases where the Court rejects 
the invitation to supervise various fundamental aspects of 
democratic politics.51 Just like these prior cases, Rucho offers a 
set of standard objections, what we have called a narrative of 
non-intervention, to justify its conclusion of non-justiciability. 
When the Court decides not to intervene in a law-and-
democracy case, it tells us a story, a narrative, embedded in 
47 Id. at 2502.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2502–03.
51 Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 31.
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a set of standard objections about why judicial supervision is 
not appropriate. The narrative of non-intervention has four 
intertwined standard moves. That is, when the Court holds 
that a law-and-democracy case is non-justiciable, it generally 
provides a combination of four related reasons for staying on 
the sidelines. One reason offered by the Court, sometimes the 
first reason offered, is that the Court should not involve itself 
in what are essentially political disputes. The role of Article 
III courts is to decide issues of law but not politics, which are 
the proper domain of the political process. The Court should 
refrain from adjudicating these types of cases because to do so 
would be to make political and not legal judgments. This is the 
law-politics distinction.52 
Second, federal courts should only decide individual-
rights cases, and not cases about the distribution of power 
between groups. Electoral-structure cases are the latter; they 
force federal courts to make judgments about the appropriate 
distribution of power among political groups. These are 
judgments that courts are not competent to make, so they 
ought not intervene. This is the rights-structure distinction.53 
Third, the fact that the Court can intervene to protect 
racial groups from discrimination in the political process 
does not provide a justification to intervene to protect other 
groups. The race cases vindicate individual rights protected 
by the Constitution, in particular, the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Those cases are therefore inapposite. This is the race-politics 
distinction.54 
Last, federal courts should not decide political-structure 
cases unless they have a judicially-manageable standard—an 
52 Id. at 246.
53 Id. at 247.
54 Id. at 248.
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ex ante rule derived from traditional sources of constitutional 
authority designed to cabin judicial discretion by separating 
unconstitutional from constitutional behavior. Given the 
absence of a judicially-manageable standard, the Court should 
not intervene. This is the rules-standards distinction.55
Chief Justice Roberts deploys each of these arguments in 
Rucho. From an analytical perspective, there is nothing new in 
Rucho; Chief Justice Roberts basically sings from the standard 
hymnal. He begins by framing the inquiry using the law-
politics distinction. As he writes: “The question here is whether 
there is an ‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in 
remedying the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether 
such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to 
legal principles, or political questions that must find their 
solutions elsewhere.”56 Claims of legal right are legal claims 
appropriately decided by the federal courts. By contrast, 
political-gerrymandering claims, Chief Justice Roberts argues, 
while relying on the rights-structure distinction, force courts as 
a matter of necessity to determine the appropriate division of 
power between political groups. This is because these claims 
“rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political 
support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power 
and influence.”57 This is a problem because federal judges 
“are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of 
fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that they were 
authorized to do so.”58 Chief Justice Roberts then goes on to 
distinguish the racial-gerrymandering cases, which, at least at 
55 Id. at 249.
56 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
57 Id. at 2499.
58 Id.
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first blush, seem to be about apportioning political power as 
a matter of fairness. He argues that racial gerrymandering is 
illegal, and adjudicating racial-gerrymandering claims does 
not require federal judges to determine the appropriate level 
of group political power and influence.59 Finally, Chief Justice 
Roberts uses the rules-standards distinction, which is the core 
of his argument. His objection in Rucho comes down to the 
view that the Court does not have a legal rule—a rule derived 
from its traditional methods of constitutional interpretation—
that can “reliably differentiate unconstitutional from 
‘constitutional political gerrymandering.’”60 In the absence of 
such a rule, there is no appropriate role for the Court to play.
The narrative of intervention is like a fairytale. It is not 
to be taken too seriously or at face value. As Justice Kagan’s 
dissent demonstrates, there are clear and easy responses to 
the majority’s objections. For example, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
argument that the malapportionment cases are distinguishable 
from the partisan-gerrymandering cases because “it is illegal 
for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, one-vote 
rule,”61 and these cases are “relatively easy to administer as 
a matter of math,”62 is either misleading or simply wrong. It 
was not inexorable that the constitutional concept of political 
equality would lead to the rule of strict population equality 
that is the one-person, one-vote principle.63 The Court made a 
conscious choice, in the face of other options, to translate the 
59 Id. at 2502–03.
60 Id. at 2499 (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 US 541, 551 (1999)).
61 Id. at 2497.
62 Id. at 2501.
63  See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Back to the Beginning: An Essay on the Court, the Law of 
Democracy, and Trust, 43 wake foresT L. rev. 1045, 1063–64 (2008) (noting that “the Court 
in Reynolds pulled its standard of choice essentially out of a hat.”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair Representation, and the Necessary 
Question of Judicial Will, 14 corNeLL J.L. & Pub. PoL’Y 423, 435 (2005).
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constitutional concept of political equality into a strict rule of 
mathematical equality, at least in the context of congressional 
districts. With respect to state legislative districts, the 
Court adopted a less strict standard, permitting deviations 
from population equality up to ten percent. One would 
be hard-pressed to come up with a compelling argument 
that the Constitution requires strict population equality in 
congressional apportionment but substantial population 
equality in state legislative districts. 
Moreover, and as importantly, the equivalent to the equal-
population principle in the context of political gerrymandering 
is non-partisanship, the conclusion that partisan considerations 
should play no role in redistricting. Indeed, there is at least as 
strong of an argument, if not a stronger argument, that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from drawing district 
lines in a manner that burdens the individual’s exercise of a 
constitutional right—the right to vote because of the voter’s 
partisan identity—as there is an argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the government from drawing 
malapportioned districts. The majority’s refusal to conclude 
that partisanship is unconstitutional—that the government 
cannot dilute the individual’s vote because the government 
does not like the individual’s expression of her political 
identity—enabled it to create a conundrum to bamboozle the 
plaintiffs. The problem with the plaintiffs’ claim, the majority 
argues, is that they cannot tell us how much partisanship is 
too much.64 But that problem is of the majority’s own making. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that prohibiting legislators 
64  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497. (“The ‘central problem’ is not determining whether a 
jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is ‘determining when political 
gerrymandering has gone too far.’”(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (plurality 
opinion))).
ACS Supreme Court Review Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause
311
from taking “partisan interests into account when drawing 
district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ 
decision to entrust districting to political entities,”65 does not, 
and cannot, address why that same argument does not apply 
in the malapportionment context. Thus, the difference between 
the constitutional status of malapportionment claims as against 
political-gerrymandering claims is simply the Court’s decision 
to police the former but not the latter.
Good fairytales are fictitious and far-fetched narratives 
that tell stories to illustrate a larger point. To focus on the 
far-fetched details is a category error. The moral of the story 
is the point of the fairytale; it is the broader lesson that we are 
supposed to learn about our world. And sometimes, even in 
a good fairytale, the moral of the story is not facially evident. 
Like a good fairytale, the narrative of non-intervention 
is valuable, not for the details of the narrative, which are 
admittedly hyperbolic and cannot be taken at face value, but 
for the purported universal truth that it contains. Moreover, as 
we sometimes must do with fairytales, we must dig deeper to 
understand the moral of the story. 
Though not facially evident, we argue here that Chief 
Justice Roberts employs the narrative of non-intervention to 
(re)affirm a traditional understanding of representative politics. 
The fundamental question presented in Rucho is whether 
constitutionally enforceable fairness norms exist in the design 
of structures of representation, or whether politicians can 
construct electoral institutions to advantage their side and 
their own voters at the expense of the other side and the other 
side’s voters. Rucho (and Benisek) were thought to be, from the 
65 Id.
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perspective of the plaintiffs at least, the perfect vehicles for 
presenting this question about constitutional fairness. Their 
facts offer clear and extreme examples of politicians seeking a 
political advantage by selecting some voters for disfavor—by 
diluting their votes—because of the voters’ political identity. 
As Justice Kagan writes in her dissent, judges should 
intervene “in only egregious cases,”66 and the facts in these 
cases speak for themselves.67 In Rucho, Republicans in 
North Carolina admitted straightforwardly that they drew 
the lines to advantage their voters and themselves at the 
expense of the Democrats and their voters. For example, State 
Representative David Lewis, co-chair of the state’s legislative 
body’s redistricting committee, instructed his redistricting 
specialist “to create a new map that would maintain the 10–3 
composition of the State’s congressional delegation come 
what might.”68 Justice Kagan quotes Representative Lewis’s 
infamous admission that his committee drew “the maps to 
give a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats 
because [I] d[o] not believe that it[’s] possible to draw a map 
with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”69 Representative 
Lewis then went on to justify the map on the ground that 
“electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So 
I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the 
country.”70 And, Justice Kagan relays, the map performed as 
designed. In both the 2016 election cycle and the 2018 election 
66 Id. at 2516.
67  Id. at 2509 (“As I relate what happened in those two States, ask yourself: Is this how 
American democracy is supposed to work?”) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2510.
69  Id.
70  Id.
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cycle, the Republicans won ten of the thirteen seats.71 Justice 
Kagan relays a similar tale in the Benisek case, which involved 
gerrymandering by the Democrats.72
After laying out these ghastly facts, Justice Kagan asks, 
almost rhetorically: “Now back to the question I asked before: 
Is that how American democracy is supposed to work? I have 
yet to meet the person who thinks so.”73 She then remarks: 
“The majority disputes none of this. I think it is important to 
underscore that fact: The majority disputes none of what I 
have said (or will say) about how gerrymanders undermine 
democracy.”74 The ineluctable answer to Justice Kagan’s 
inquiry—given these undisputed facts, is this how democracy 
is supposed to work?—ought to lead to an affirmation of the 
presumption implied in the question: American democracy is 
not supposed to work this way because there are constitutional 
rules of fairness that constrain political actors. 
But of course, the majority does not find the answer 
ineluctable, and it certainly does not share the assumption 
that democracy is not supposed to work this way. From the 
majority’s perspective, the extent of partisanship in the design 
of structures of representation is endogenous to the political 
process; the level of partisanship depends upon what the polity 
wants, and the political process is free to choose whatever 
it wants because the appropriate level of partisanship is a 
political judgment. Chief Justice Roberts quotes Gaffney v. 
Cummings for the proposition that politics and partisanship 
71  Matthew Bloch & Jasmine C. Lee, North Carolina Special Election Results: Ninth House 
District, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:59 PM). The election for the thirteenth seat in the 
2018 cycle was not officially filled until 2019. The election was delayed because fraud 
tainted the initial election results. The seat was won by the Republican candidate Dan 
Bishop.
72 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511.
73  Id.
74  Id. at 2512.
ACS Supreme Court Review
314
are “inseparable from districting and apportionment.”75 What 
is fairness, Chief Justice Roberts asks. Are at-large districts, 
which can award a party with all of the seats even though it 
received a bare majority of electoral support, inherently unfair? 
This means “that a party could garner nearly half of the vote 
statewide and wind up without any seats.”76 What about 
districts that are gerrymandered for the purpose of reflecting 
the polity’s distribution of political power? Are those inherently 
unfair? Is it inherently unfair to gerrymander a district to 
protect an incumbent or to maintain communities of interest? 
These “basic questions,” the majority contends, “are political, 
not legal.”77 They involve first-order questions that raise trade-
offs among important values and principles. These are not the 
type of trade-offs that the federal courts can make or ought to 
make. Is this how a democracy is supposed to work? Well, yes, 
if that is what the democracy wants.
Rucho often reads like a descriptive account of American 
representative politics. But of course, the majority’s opinion 
cannot work simply as description. The question presented in 
Rucho is not whether politicians manipulate electoral lines; as 
Justice Kagan underscores in her dissent, everyone agrees that 
they do. The question is whether they ought to. And as Justice 
Kagan clearly and forcefully shows, the doctrine, particularly 
as applied by the lower courts below, can easily be read and 
applied to prohibit the practice, at the very least to prohibit 
the worst form of it. The conclusion is thus inescapable: Rucho 
must be understood as a normative defense of the practice of 
partisanship. 
75  Id. at 2497 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)).
76 Id. at 2499.
77 Id. at 2500
ACS Supreme Court Review Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause
315
Rucho reflects a traditional portrayal of American 
representative democracy as—rightly or inevitably—partisan, 
unfair, and dirty. And given these unavoidable features, it 
is futile and unbecoming for federal courts to try to remove 
the lifeblood of the process, which is its partisanship, its 
sordidness, and its own conception of what is fair or unfair. If 
the polity is unsatisfied with the sordid nature of its politics, 
the Constitution has provided a structural political process 
solution. This defense of traditional politics is the best way to 
understand Rucho.
*   *   *
If we are right that Rucho represents a normative defense 
of dirty politics, of the legitimacy of employing partisanship 
to acquire political power so that politicians may advance 
their particular views of the common good, what does Rucho 
mean for the future of political-gerrymandering claims? 
American representative democracy has been on a slow march 
toward greater fairness, equality, and openness. Progress in 
this domain has not always been inevitable and, to be sure, 
we have sometimes taken some significant steps backwards. 
Notwithstanding these backward steps, American democracy 
is more representative today than it has been in any time 
in our history. To the extent that Rucho reflects a clash of 
normative visions about fairness, and to the extent that a 
traditional Darwinian view of politics prevailed in Rucho, the 
traditionalists are increasingly in the minority. Recent polls 
have shown that the American public is supportive of judicial 
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limits on political gerrymandering.78 Moreover, we are seeing 
a growing receptiveness in the United States to alternative 
voting systems, to semi-proportional systems, and to more 
electoral innovation.79 Thus, while proportional representation 
is currently a dirty word in the Court’s jurisprudence, it 
might come to be viewed in the United States as the de facto 
standard of fairness for judging electoral systems. And while 
partisanship is now viewed as inevitable, it might come to be 
viewed as constitutionally unacceptable. Change will come, if 
it comes, as a consequence of a change in our normative vision. 
If this is right, it is not inconceivable that we will come to see 
Rucho as we now look at Colegrove v. Green. And thus, it won’t 
be long before this generation gets its very own Baker v. Carr.
If this is right, it also raises a note of caution for scholars of 
election law. Election law scholars and election law scholarship 
was once significantly oriented around doctrinal, theoretical, 
and normative arguments about how to think about various 
law and democracy questions. This doctrinal, normative, 
and theoretical orientation allowed legal academics to make 
use of their comparative advantage. In the last few years, 
the scholarship in the field has taken a significant empirical 
turn, which in many respects is a useful development. But 
that empirical turn seems to have come at the expense of 
the focus on understanding the doctrine, theory, and the 
normative trade-offs that are inevitable in this domain. For 
example, in the domain of political gerrymandering, scholars 
have misunderstood the term of art, judicially manageable 
standards, to mean an empirical or mathematical standard. 
This misunderstanding is particularly encapsulated by the 
78  Americans Are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering, breNNaN cTr. for JusTice (Mar. 15, 
2019).
79 Ranked Choice Voting/Instant Runoff, fair voTe (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
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excessive focus on the ill-fated efficiency gap. If our account 
of Rucho is correct, that it was decided on normative and 
theoretical grounds, the field of election law might need to 
figure out how to privilege once more the doctrinal, theoretical, 
and normative approaches that are the staple of legal scholars 
in the face of legal problems. 
